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THE DEVELOPMENT OF AccOuNTiNg 
iN EuROPE iN THE ERA OF sciENTiFic 
MANAgEMENT: THE iTALiAN 
ENgiNEERiNg cONgLOMERATE, 
ANsALDO, 1918-1940
Abstract: utilizing archival materials, this paper examines the case 
of the Genoa-based firm, Ansaldo, which, by the early decades of 
the 20th century, had emerged as a major force in the inter-related 
fields of engineering, shipbuilding, and metal and steel manufacture 
in italy. following financial problems immediately after World War i 
and during the 1920s, the company was subsequently taken under the 
umbrella of the italian state’s financial holding unit, the institute for 
industrial reconstruction (iri), in the 1930s. utilizing lewin’s theory 
of change as a framework for investigating change in management 
accounting, the paper examines the internal and external factors 
influencing the development of cost/management accounting at the 
company. these are also examined against the background of the de-
velopment of scientific management, both in italy and elsewhere. 
iNtroductioN
 it has recently been stated that management accounting is 
“not simply a technical activity but a set of practices that pro-
duce and reproduce not just organizational life but also social 
and economic life at a more macro level.” thus, it is appropri-
ate to “fully understand management accounting,” that one 
should “examine its social, economic and political context and 
Acknowledgments: the authors would like to thank Mr. Alessandro lom-
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recognize the role of power and conflict” [cooper and Hopper, 
2007, p. 208]. this is not to deny the need to examine events and 
factors at play within an individual context, but rather to em-
phasize that individual organizations do not exist in a vacuum, 
and that changes in accounting for managerial purposes will be 
influenced by factors both internal and external to the organiza-
tion. this is particularly the case in relation to the focus of this 
study, the italian engineering conglomerate Ansaldo during the 
period between the two world wars.
 the interwar years were a period when scientific manage-
ment began to come of age, not only in America but also in eu-
rope. While there has been much research on the development 
of scientific management in different countries [Nelson, 1980, 
1992; Moutet, 1992], the relationship between the growth of a 
scientific approach to management and the development of cost 
and management accounting is little understood. in the Ameri-
can context, chandler [1977, 1990] has pointed to the growth 
of large, multidivisional M-form corporations between the wars 
with the development of managerial hierarchies and accounting 
techniques such as standard costing and budgeting. While chan-
dler has suggested that it was the growth of the former which 
gave rise to the latter, Johnson and Kaplan [1987, p. 21] argue 
that the link was possibly the other way around, that the devel-
opment of these accounting techniques may have made possible 
the growth of the large, M-form corporation. in work relating to 
the dowlais iron company in the mid-19th century, Boyns and 
edwards [1997] have suggested that the relationship between 
the emergence of large firms and the development of cost/man-
agement accounting may have been the result of a symbiotic, 
rather than a causal, relationship [see also, Alford, 1976].
 A key element in the link between the growth of large busi-
nesses and developments in accounting in the early 20th cen-
tury would therefore appear to be the development of a more 
scientific approach to business management. thus, accounting 
historians have seen the early decades of the 20th century as a 
crucial period for the advancement of cost accounting, not the 
least due to the development of costing systems, the use of more 
scientific methods of overhead allocation, and the introduction 
of standard costing and budgeting [solomons, 1952; Garner, 
1954; sowell, 1973; chatfield, 1977; epstein, 1978]. While bud-
geting and standard costing have been seen as an essentially 
American phenomenon [Wells, 1978; locke, 1984; Johnson and 
Kaplan, 1987], the extent of their adoption in the u.s. is not 
known with any degree of accuracy. indeed, fleischman [2000] 
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has questioned the extent of the adoption of scientific manage-
ment by 1920, suggesting that even by 1940 its use in the u.s. 
was limited. 
 in europe, research into the links between scientific man-
agement and the development of cost/management account-
ing has generated a somewhat confused picture. in Britain, 
loft [1986, 1990] has suggested that, in the 1920s, scientific 
management reinforced the positive impact of World War i on 
costing systems in British firms. However, the extent to which 
scientific management was adopted in Britain in the interwar 
period is still far from being known with any degree of accuracy, 
though there was clearly an increasing emphasis on the use of 
piecework systems and, from the mid-1920s, the Bedaux system 
 [littler, 1982; Whitston, 1996, 1997; smith and Boyns, 2005]. 
Nevertheless, examples do exist of companies adopting either 
standard costing or budgeting [Boyns, 1998a, b] or both, some-
times in conjunction with the adoption of scientific manage-
ment, such as the case of Hans renold ltd. [Boyns et al., 2000; 
Boyns, 2003]. the adoption of standard costing and budgetary 
control in the interwar years, however, was patchy with no clear 
link emerging as to company size or ownership/governance 
structure [see Quail, 1996, 1997; Boyns et al., 2000] or indus-
trial sector. Boyns et al. [2004] found some limited evidence of 
a growing interest in standard costing in the British chemical 
industry before World War ii, while in the iron and steel in-
dustry, edwards et al. [2002, 2003] found a reluctance to adopt 
such techniques among most, though not all, companies before 
the 1950s and 1960s. in the engineering industry in the west of 
scotland, evidence suggests a similar reticence [see McKinstry, 
1999; fleming et al., 2000]. 
 in france, despite the interest shown in scientific manage-
ment by vehicle manufacturers such as louis renault and 
Marius Berliet, standard costing failed to be implemented in 
any french business before World War ii, though an increasing 
number adopted budgeting from the mid-1920s [Berland, 1999; 
Berland and Boyns, 2002]. According to Zimnovitch [1997], the 
failure of standard costing to appear in france until the late 
1950s and early 1960s, in part reflects the attitudes of french 
accountants. concerned as they were during the interwar years 
to secure professional status for themselves, french accountants 
favored the prix de revient method – full costing based on the 
integration of costing within the financial accounting system 
– thereby effectively establishing a barrier to the implementa-
tion of standard costing which was depicted as a “non-account-
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ing” method. it is possible that similar forces were at work in 
Germany where coenenberg and schoenfeld [1990, p. 97] have 
noted that, during the period 1900-1933, internal and external 
accounting within firms was coming to be viewed as part of a 
single, unified system. 
 Against this background, this paper attempts to throw light 
on the link between the development of scientific management 
and that of cost/management accounting in italy between the 
two world wars through an examination of the case of Ansaldo, 
a major italian engineering, shipbuilding, and metal manufac-
turing conglomerate. this company constitutes a particularly 
interesting case study for many reasons. first, the company was 
one of the most important firms on the italian industrial scene 
throughout the early decades of the 20th century as the largest 
and most important business in italy during World War i. fur-
thermore, at various times it was involved in relationships with 
both european and non-european companies.1 second, its story 
is particularly representative of a particular way of doing busi-
ness; namely, close links with government, a method which was 
characteristic of the early stages of industrialization in italy and 
which impacted the development of management techniques 
within the company. third, Ansaldo belongs to a sector which, 
in many countries, was in the forefront of the development of 
cost accounting techniques and the use of cost information for 
internal management purposes. thus, a study of Ansaldo can 
reveal not only what happened in a major italian firm during the 
early decades of the 20th century, it can possibly shed light more 
generally on developments that can be contrasted with those in 
other countries, both in europe and in America.
 our analysis of management accounting change at Ansaldo 
is underpinned by the framework provided by Kurt lewin’s 
theory of change and will proceed as follows. in the next section, 
we examine the issue of management accounting change gener-
ally, illustrating how lewin’s theory provides a potential frame-
work for historical research into this topic, enabling as it does 
the inclusion of the role of human agents and contextualizing 
influences in such change. this is followed by an examination 
of the development of scientific management in europe during 
1 in April 1930, the Mechanical Engineer, the official Journal of the American 
society of Mechanical engineers, published a special edition in order to celebrate 
the 50th anniversary of the Association. it published a Hall of fame compris-
ing 106 distinguished engineers, including f.W. taylor, A. carnegie, H. Bessemer, 
etc., among whom only pio perrone, sometime chairman of Ansaldo, was italian 
[quoted in fasce, 1993].
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the study period to provide the contextual background for our 
case study of Ansaldo. the case study is split into two sub-sec-
tions, corresponding to the periods 1918-1933 and 1933-1940. 
the year 1933 represented an important landmark for Ansaldo 
as it came under the control of the state’s new industrial holding 
arm, the iri (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale), an event 
which led in 1935 to the appointment of Agostino rocca as chief 
executive. for each period, we examine the archival evidence to 
determine the key factors related to the development of both sci-
entific management and cost/management accounting and the 
links, if any, between them. We then review our findings in the 
light of european and American contexts.
cHANGe iN MANAGeMeNt AccouNtiNG
 in the last six years, two special editions devoted to the 
theme of management accounting change have appeared in 
Management Accounting Research. in the first, editors Burns and 
Vaivio [2001, p. 392] pointed out that, “change is an exciting but 
problematic concept, defying definition and structured analysis.” 
in the more recent, Busco et al. [2007, p. 125] suggest that, as a 
result of the proliferation of studies over recent years, the time 
has come for “systematizing the analysis of management ac-
counting change along some key dimensions which can prompt 
some further reflection.” in this pursuit, they suggest four di-
mensions: “the agents and objects of change; the forms and ratio 
of change; the space and time of change; and the interplay be-
tween change and stability.” Given the rapid development of this 
literature, it is not surprising that there is no single, generally 
accepted theory of change in management accounting. indeed, 
some authors have queried whether the emphasis should even 
be on change. Quattrone and Hopper [2001] suggest that per-
haps it ought to be on “drift,” while Granlund [2001, p. 161] is 
more concerned with “stability.” Granlund went on to note that 
stability and change can co-exist, while “continuity of account-
ing practices over time is a result of a large number of issues 
that take effect on various levels of organizational operations.”
 one framework which can be used to analyze such change 
or stability is Kurt lewin’s theory of change. Although this 
theory relates to a planned approach to managing proposed 
change, his ideas can be used to understand and interpret, ret-
rospectively, developments that have already occurred. lewin’s 
model comprises three stages – “unfreezing” of the current 
equilibrium or status quo, a necessity if people are going to be 
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motivated towards change; “moving” to a new equilibrium by 
changing what needs to be changed; and “refreezing,” making 
the new equilibrium permanent. unfreezing is necessary in or-
der to overcome the strains of individual resistance and group 
conformity and can be achieved in three ways: (1) increasing the 
forces driving change, (2) reducing the forces resisting change, 
or (3) some combination of (1) and (2). Moving can also be en-
couraged in three ways: (1) persuading employees that the cur-
rent status quo is not beneficial to them and encouraging them 
to explore new possibilities; (2) getting them to work together on 
a quest for new and relevant information; and (3) connecting the 
group view to that of a well-respected, powerful leader or leaders 
who support(s) change. refreezing is vital to successful change. 
Without it, there is the strong possibility that there may be a 
reversion to the previous status quo. Hence, it is vital that the 
new values generated are integrated into the community’s tradi-
tions and a balance achieved between the driving forces and the 
resisting/restraining forces. if there is such a balance, then the 
new position will be an equilibrium since change only occurs 
when the strength of one set of forces (either driving change or 
resisting it) is greater than that of the other set of forces.
 Although lewin’s theory was advanced in the 1940s, with 
many other theories of change developed since (e.g., complexity 
theories), it can be argued that it forms the basis of all modern 
approaches to change [Burnes, 2004]. indeed, it has been ar-
gued that most theories of change are essentially variations on 
lewin’s basic model. “scratch any account of creating and man-
aging change and the idea that change is a three-stage process 
which necessarily begins with a process of unfreezing will not 
be far below the surface” [Hendry, 1996, p. 624]. lewin’s articu-
lation of a stage model of change is particularly useful for histo-
rians since it enables a whole range of potential factors to play a 
role. for Busco et al., the key issue that has to be addressed by 
 scholars is “to locate the agency prompting the whole process” 
of management accounting change. previous authors on the sub-
ject have suggested a wide range of possible agencies for change, 
from human actors to non-human actants, sometimes placed 
within “broader contextual issues, related to certain institutional 
pressures, political decisions, economic imperatives, and some 
combination of them” [Busco et al., 2007, pp. 129-130]. 
 Although it may not be as all-embracing as social cognitive 
theory which recognizes the potential impact of environmen-
tal influences, personal factors, and attributes of the behavior 
itself, lewin’s theory does allow for the possible influence of 
6
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 35 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss1/3
55Antonelli et al., Scientific Management at Ansaldo
key persons or groups; “change agents” in the terminology of 
Niehoff. Granlund [2001], for example, emphasized the impor-
tance of a key individual, one of the firm’s financial managers, in 
producing change at a finnish food manufacturer. individuals, 
however, can act both as a barrier to change and as a focal point 
for change, with the same individual possibly acting as a bar-
rier on one occasion and a focal point on another. Management 
accounting change, however, rarely takes place in a vacuum. 
As otley [2001, p. 260] has pointed out, “Accounting systems 
are often implicated in the wider processes of organizational 
change, providing both a vehicle through which such changes 
can be promoted but also a potential rigidity and barrier to 
change.” research in management accounting has suggested 
that major developments in organizational structure and ac-
counting systems require motivators, catalysts, and facilitators, 
but are often held back by barriers [innes and Mitchell, 1990; 
cobb et al., 1995], including the attitude of personnel and exist-
ing organizational structures and cultures [Markus and pfef-
fer, 1983; roberts and silvester, 1996]. to become established, 
new systems of accounting have to secure legitimacy, and they 
must develop a workable relationship between the languages of 
production and accounting [scapens and roberts, 1993]. such 
ideas clearly resonate with the framework suggested by lewin. 
Hence, we adopt his theory as a framework for our discussion 
of management accounting developments at Ansaldo during the 
study period.
tHe deVelopMeNt of scieNtific  
MANAGeMeNt iN europe, 1918-1940
 As Nelson [1992, p. 16] has indicated, there were only a few 
stirrings of scientific management in europe before World War 
i, with change being uncoordinated and gradual. the war and 
its aftermath, however, provided something of a stimulus with 
industrialists, unions, and governments in most countries all 
coming to view scientific management in a more positive light. 
Most noticeably, post-war, pre-depression europe was charac-
terized by a new tolerance among workers and union leaders 
and by the emergence of associations dedicated to the promo-
tion of scientific management. in many countries, most notably 
in Germany [Nelson, 1992, pp. 2, 23-24], this found expression 
in the idea of rationalization, a broad social concept aimed at 
leading to a “better society.” However, the Great depression ap-
pears to have diminished the attraction of American ideas and 
its european surrogate, rationalization.
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 the development of rationalization movements after 1918 
was widespread throughout europe, in countries like the u.K. 
still generally committed to laissez-faire economics, in ones like 
Germany where the state played a guiding role, and in those 
such as russia with virtually total state control. italy clearly 
was in the last category as the state played a significant role in 
economic, political, and social affairs. While the early stages 
of italian industrialization, through 1920, took place in a “po-
litico-industrial setting which left space for political and trade 
union liberties and for the development of forms of economic 
democracy, … [d]uring the 20 years of fascism [from 1922 to 
1943], that liberty and development were sacrificed” [Bonelli, 
1994, p. 629]. fascism was both a bureaucratic and political sys-
tem, designed not only to control the working classes through 
influencing everyday life, but also to reduce foreign competi-
tion, thereby sustaining national capitalism [costa et al., 1978]. 
overall, it is commonly agreed that fascism operated as a strong 
institutional mechanism which protected the large national cor-
porations due to the state’s close connections with big financial 
interests. 
 As in other european countries, with the notable exception 
of Britain, a national organization dedicated to the promotion of 
scientific management was established in italy in January 1926. 
this organization, Ente nazionale italiano per l’organizzazione 
scientifica del lavoro (eNios), represented the institutionaliza-
tion of the introduction of scientific management principles. it 
was promoted following changes in Mussolini’s cabinet in 1925 
and the appointment of the engineer, professor Giuseppe Bel-
luzzo, as Minister of National economy. A major supporter of 
taylorism in the interwar period [fauri, 1999, p. 101], Belluzzo 
started a campaign for industrial reorganization which favored 
concentration of industry, increasing the size of business units, 
and encouraging internal reorganization. in 1926-1927, the 
Consiglio Superiore dell’Economia Nazionale (supreme council 
of National economy) decided to make instruction in scientific 
management compulsory in all technical schools and institutes 
in italy and to “introduce the most modern methods of indus-
trial organization into the chief Government departments and 
the state industrial undertakings, by way of setting an example 
to the nation as a whole” [devinat, 1927, p. 85].
 Although Belluzzo’s campaign was supported by 
L’organizzazione scientifica del lavoro, a review published by 
eNios which enjoyed widespread circulation with 15,966 
subscribers in 1930, mainly in northern italy, his approach 
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did not find sympathy with northern industrialists. in 1928, 
the newspaper, L’informazione industriale, an emanation of 
turin industrialists, wrote that [quoted in fauri, 1999, p. 102]: 
“rationalization … means demolishing our premises and build-
ing new ones, changing all our machinery and concentrating 
factories producing similar products … even though we are not 
in the least financial experts, we can promptly and surely say 
no.” indeed, sapelli [1978, p. 62] has suggested that within the 
“standardization” process of this period, the accent was more on 
“unification” of materials and equipment than on “normaliza-
tion”, i.e., the growth of large-scale mass production. 
 thus, in italy, as in other countries across europe, many 
industrialists remained skeptical of scientific management dur-
ing the 1920s despite the existence of national and international 
organizations dedicated to its promotion. the rationalization 
movement, which was already beginning to falter by the end of 
the 1920s, was effectively silenced during the depression era as 
Americanization no longer appeared the path to follow. some in 
europe were completely disenchanted with the whole scientific 
movement. thus, ernst poensgen, iron and steel industrialist 
and head of the German steel Association, stated in exaspera-
tion to a colleague in 1931 [quoted in Nolan, 1994, p. 228]:
don’t mention science to me! We’ve been pumped full 
with science: scientific technology, scientific manage-
ment, scientific market research, scientific accountancy, 
and so on and so on. And where has all this science 
brought us?
 despite the problem with rationalization as a broad social 
concept, not all industrialists were turned away from every 
aspect of scientific management. Many were happy to apply tay-
lor’s ideas at the shop-floor level, as exemplified by the europe-
wide success of the Bedaux consultancy in selling its simplified 
version of taylorism to businessmen desperate to cut costs as a 
means of ensuring survival [Kipping, 1999]. As table 1 shows, 
the Bedaux consultancy was very successful in both france and 
Britain during the 1930s, but less so in Germany where its office 
was closed in 1933 following Hitler’s rise to power, although it 
was allowed to re-open in 1937 under a different name. 
 in italy in the 1930s, there was a backlash against scientific 
management generally and the Bedaux system in particular. As 
noted in table 1, the adoption of the Bedaux system grew much 
more slowly in italy than in any other country between 1931 
and 1937. Although attempts to apply the system had been made 
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since 1927, as in other countries, such attempts had met with 
strong resistance from workers. concerns over wage reduc-
tions and intensification of work rhythms led to strike action on 
numerous occasions by the fascist unions despite strikes being 
illegal in italy at the time [Volpato, 1978, pp. 214-216]. con-
cerns over the nature of piecework agreements made under the 
Bedaux system led, on November 9, 1934, to a motion being ad-
opted by the central corporation committee (Comitato Centrale 
delle Corporazioni) requiring that every piecework agreement 
must have been collectively bargained (contrattazione collettiva). 
the passing of this motion has led lavista [2003] to declare that 
Bedauxism (Bedonismo) had been abolished, while Kipping 
[1999, p. 200] has claimed that the Bedaux consultancy in italy 
was banned by the state in 1936. the impact of the 1934 mo-
tion, however, was that, in early 1935 in those businesses which 
operated piecework systems, managements and unions were 
forced to renegotiate their agreements [sapelli, 1978, pp. 235-
236]. in practice, however, the new bonus-related schemes that 
emerged were merely variations of the previous Bedaux arrange-
ments, most particularly because the Bedaux system found gen-
eral ideological acceptance among fascist industrialists [fauri, 
1999, p. 104]. indeed, its emphasis on the human power factor, 
ignoring the type of machinery or working methods, meant that 
there was no need for any major investment by firms to assess 
standard outputs and bonus rates; that is, it was a “ready to use” 
system [Musso, 1987, p. 107]. Nevertheless, there were mixed 
feelings towards the new systems, varying from enthusiastic imi-
tation to scornful refusal.
 the growing politicization of the debate around scientific 
management in italy in the 1930s, in particular the fact that the 
policy of high wages proposed by taylor was considered politi-
TABLE 1
The international Expansion of the  
Bedaux consultancy during the 1930s
country office opened
plants using the Bedaux system
1931 1937
united states  1916/18  52  500
British isles  1926  30  225
Germany  1927  5  25
italy  1927  21  49
france  1929  16  144
source: Kipping [1999, p. 198]
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cally unacceptable at this time, was reflected in L’organizzazione 
scientifica del lavoro. from 1934 on, the articles published in 
eNios’s own organ indicate a shift in focus, referring merely to 
the introduction of new plant and machinery, the review acting 
as more of a marketing showcase for certain companies than 
as a device for fostering debate on specific topics. fauri [1999, 
p. 113] also notes that, as in other countries within europe in 
the 1930s, the American model of productivity lost its catalytic 
inspiration as autarchy and protectionism prevailed.
 
source MAteriAls
 the study of Ansaldo which is conducted in the next two 
sections of the paper is based on archival material and pub-
lished secondary sources. the source of the archival material 
is the Ansaldo archive (Archivio Storico Ansaldo, hereafter AsA, 
located in Genoa) which was opened in 1980 and contains all of 
the surviving records of the company over a period of 150 years. 
over the last 25 years, the Ansaldo archives have been extensive-
ly examined by economic and business historians,2 resulting in 
the publication of a number of major studies of various aspects 
of the company’s history, particularly works by rugafiori [1981, 
1992], doria [1989], and falchero [1990]. Nevertheless, until 
now, no management or accounting historian has yet examined 
the company’s records for evidence of links between accounting 
change and scientific management developments during the in-
terwar period.
 Although the survival of cost accounting records for Ansaldo 
has not been as great as one might have hoped, it is possible 
from those extant and other documentary sources, especially 
records deposited by various top managers from the study pe-
riod, to piece together key aspects of the cost system and how 
it changed over time. As with many such historical studies, it is 
not always possible to provide precise details of the use made of 
the cost information generated. However, the relationship be-
tween changes in managerial approach and accounting is clearly 
observable from the surviving archival records, supported by 
secondary literature.
2 Bigatti [1998, p. 121] has indicated that the Ansaldo archive, the functions 
of which now extend far beyond records maintenance, has become an important 
center for italian business history research.
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ANsAldo: AccouNtiNG ANd MANAGeMeNt 
deVelopMeNts, 1918-1933
Overview: World War i saw massive growth at Ansaldo as the 
company continued to pursue its policy of vertical integration 
which had begun to take shape before hostilities commenced. 
Numerous acquisitions resulted in the capital of the company 
rising from 30 million lira in 1914 to 500 million in 1918 and 
employment growing from 10,432 in 1914 to 47,163 in 1917 (see 
table 2). By the end of the war the company comprised, among 
other things, steel foundries and factories, shipbuilding yards, 
various mechanical engineering departments, lignite mines in 
tuscany, the cogne iron ore mines, and an electricity generating 
company, impianti elettrici Valdostani [falchero, 1986]. 
TABLE 2
Key statistics, Ansaldo during World War i
1914 1915 1916 1917 1918
stated capital (lira) 30,000,000 30,000,000 45,000,000 100,000,000 500,000,000
investments (lira) 20,002,444 68,015,772 126,571,621 373,765,510
employment 10,432 18,322 33,908 47,163 30,397
Airplane 
 production (no.)
63 126 768 2,064
Airplane engines
 production (no.) 203 389
production of steel
 (tons) 19,176 26,415 31,341 40,275 52,631
source: AsA ssNB 532/7 
 the expansion of Ansaldo reflected a twin desire on the 
part of the company’s owners, Mario and pio perrone, to make 
the company less reliant on external suppliers, whether italian 
or foreign, while simultaneously satisfying their thirst for an 
industrial, economic, and political power base. this latter desire 
was reflected in the perrone family’s various other activities, 
most notably the acquisition of a number of newspapers and the 
establishment of the Banca italiana di sconto in 1914 [falchero, 
1990; Galli della loggia, 1970].3 With this development, Ansaldo 
became one of the major italian industrial-financial complexes 
of the time although remaining heavily reliant on the italian 
state as before World War i.
3 According to falchero [1983], italian nationalism provided the basis for the 
establishment of the Banca italiana di sconto, its main purpose being to under-
mine the influence of the “German Bank” (Banca Commerciale) in key sectors of 
the italian economy.
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 indeed, the war brought Ansaldo even closer to the italian 
state with production, which increased dramatically (see table 
2), becoming increasingly focused on war materials, includ-
ing airplanes. Not surprisingly, Ansaldo’s turnover and profits 
grew during the war, although this would subsequently lead to 
accusations of profiteering and consequent legal action by the 
state once the war ended [falchero, 1990]. the ending of hos-
tilities created additional problems for the firm, not the least of 
which was a concern over payment for job orders in progress 
and how to convert production back to peacetime requirements. 
While Ansaldo subsequently received payment for job orders in 
progress, the amount was somewhat lower than the value of the 
work completed, compounding the problem of falling revenues 
consequent upon the economic problems of the immediate post-
war years. 
 financial problems coincided with recognition that there 
was a major need for investment and restructuring to stem 
growing labor costs. during the war, the emphasis within Ansal-
do had been on securing production at all costs; little by way 
of any rationalization of production processes had occurred. 
during 1918-1919, efforts were undertaken in this direction 
by the perrone brothers, but it proved to be too little, too late. 
cash flow problems; a lack of financial support from the Banca 
italiana di sconto, which itself failed in the early 1920s; the loss 
of political support from the Nitti government; legal problems in 
respect of war profiteering; and difficulties with the workforce 
during the period which became known as the “red biennium,”4 
pushed Ansaldo into a major crisis. in 1921, Ansaldo recorded 
a loss of just over 180 million lira (see table 3) and found itself 
in major financial difficulties. As a result, at the beginning of 
1922, the perrone family was forced out and ownership of the 
business passed to a branch of the Bank of italy. A new company 
was formed with capital of 200 million lira, divided between the 
Banca Nazionale di credito, a member of the credito italiano 
group, one of the most powerful former opponents of the per-
rone family, and the former Gio Ansaldo company [rugafiori, 
1978]. in 1925, Banca Nazionale di credito became the sole 
owner of the concern.
4 the “red biennium” refers to a period immediately following World War 
i when there occurred a large number of strikes among the working classes 
throughout italy. the term “red” is used to reflect the fact that the strikes are 
considered to have been inspired by communist ideology.
13
Antonelli et al.: Development of accounting in Europe in the era of scientific management: The Italian engineering conglomerate, Ansaldo, 1918-1940
Published by eGrove, 2008
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200862  
tABle 3
Ansaldo profits and losses (in lira), 1919-1940
year  profit/(loss) year  profit/(loss)
1919  35,590,802 1930  6,664,075
1920  5,947,763 1931  153,177
1921 (180,884,987) 1932  119,045
1922 (331,027,455) 1933 (90,448.622)
1923  3,705,812 1934  1,243,024
1924  4,923,403 1935  (8,980,747)
1925  6,666,612 1936  316,736
1926  (15,958,823) 1937  552,332
1927  (24,981,193) 1938  1,494,869
1928  503,758 1939  9,925,557
1929  6,566,103 1940  14,459,835
source: Vasta [1998, table 9, p. 210; 1999, table 8, p. 268].
 
 on the change of ownership in 1922, the perrones’ strategy 
of vertical integration was reversed and virtually the entire man-
agerial hierarchy was dismissed. Many factories and plants were 
closed or sold, resulting in employment falling to about 10,000 
workers in 1922. under the partial, and subsequently full, con-
trol of the bank, Ansaldo’s financial position was stabilized but 
remained weak, with the company recording a mixture of small 
profits and losses through the 1920s (see table 3). With the 1929 
world slump, there was a further significant reduction in activ-
ity at Ansaldo [degli esposti, 1993], with employment falling 
from 13,400 in 1930 to 9,230 in 1932. the company once again 
recorded a major financial loss in 1933. 
Organizational Change and Scientific Management to 1933: Be-
fore World War i, Ansaldo had suffered from organizational and 
managerial problems [Guagnini, 1997], both within its larger 
departments and with respect to a lack of coordination between 
departments. directors of the company were sent to visit some 
of the most important firms in the engineering and steel sec-
tors, such as ford, Bethlehem steel, Krupps, etc., in order to 
study new methods of (scientific) management, as yet largely 
unknown in italy. However, with the emphasis of the company’s 
production comprising one-off jobs or small batch production, 
these methods, more suited to mass production scenarios, failed 
to be implemented before the war [AsA, f. puri 7/13]. 
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 during World War i, Ansaldo acquired plants located in 
turin formerly operated by fiat (Ansaldo san Giorgio) where, 
prior to the takeover, fiat personnel had been engaged in the 
first experimental applications of fordist methods in italy 
[Volpato, 1995]. While these methods continued to be applied 
after the takeover, and despite being an improvement on the 
practices used at Ansaldo’s departments in Genoa, no attempt 
was made to apply them to the company’s other factories before 
the end of the war [AsA, Ap sNB, 128/24]. Nevertheless, a new 
system of labor organization involving greater standardization, 
the division of productive processes, the employment of non- 
qualified labor, and the general introduction of piecework 
was implemented at Ansaldo during the war [Molinari, 1997]. 
However, as dewerpe [1985] has argued, the piecework systems 
introduced at this time were ad hoc, the piece rates being de-
termined in a non-scientific manner. even so, there is evidence 
of support for major reorganization among some sections of 
the company’s management during 1918-1921, including the 
application of fordism to improve efficiency and reduce pro-
duction costs [AsA, Ap, ssNB 128/24]. the strength of such sup-
port, however, proved insufficient to affect an unfreezing of the 
status quo, not the least because the company’s board remained 
unconvinced of the potential benefits of the proposed changes. 
the perrone brothers, in particular, took the view that the 
company’s diverse range of products, the widespread geographi-
cal spread of its factories, the distance from suppliers, and the 
fluctuating nature of demand presented obstacles to the appli-
cation of these new techniques [AsA, Ap ssNB 128/24; AsA, f. 
puri, 7/13]. 
 the forced departure of the perrones and much of their 
top management team in 1922 clearly presented a scenario in 
which change could occur since a number of existing barriers 
to change were removed. However, little change was effected for 
several reasons. first, the managers appointed to replace those 
of the former era were largely from a military or political back-
ground5 and had little by way of business skills or knowledge 
5 An example of the chief executive officers during the period following the 
perrone era is colonel ugo cavallero, who was in charge at Ansaldo from 1928-
1933. Born in 1880, he was a captain in the italian royal Army during World War 
i and chief of the italian Army delegation at Versailles in 1919. Between 1920 
and 1925, having left the army, he managed some italian firms. from 1925 to 
1928, as a close friend of Benito Mussolini, he was appointed Minister of War (the 
 italian Army was reorganized under his control), senator of the reign, count, and 
 Major-General of the italian royal Army.
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of new managerial structures and techniques. second, the key 
managerial emphasis for many years after 1922 was merely to 
avoid bankruptcy. third, there was the company’s relationship 
with the state, which was a major customer. under Mussolini, 
the nature and power of the italian state developed greatly and 
this, together with the increasing likelihood of the state taking a 
major stake in or even control of the company, militated against 
the development of a stable and powerful system of governance 
within the firm. commenting on the productive organization of 
the company during the war and immediately after, sarli, man-
ager of elettrotecnico from 1925, considered the company very 
weak and uncoordinated [Gibelli, 1998]. 
 Nevertheless, despite such strong forces militating against 
any change, local managerial initiatives can be noted at Ansaldo 
during the second half of the 1920s. At the third international 
congress on scientific Management, held in rome in september 
1927, for example, Mario fossati presented a paper entitled, 
L’organisation scientifique du travail dans les mines et les usines 
electrosiderurgique Ansaldo Cogne Aosta, in which he described 
the application of new management techniques inspired by 
taylorism at the cogne complex of iron ore mines and steel fac-
tories where he was director. Although the main focus of the pa-
per is the introduction of new plant and equipment, including a 
new railway, new elevators, and electric furnaces, fossati [1927, 
pp. 8-9] reports that significant increases in productivity and 
efficiency had been achieved as a result of the managerial and 
technical changes implemented. that this was not an isolated 
example is made clear by pellegrini [1929] in his description of 
organizational changes inspired by taylor’s scientific manage-
ment at the Ansaldo lorenz telephone factory at cornigliano 
from 1926. such local initiatives in respect to the utilization of 
scientific management within Ansaldo once again emphasize 
the possibility of limited change occurring within parts of the 
business, but also suggest that the forces acting against change 
within the organization as a whole were stronger, resulting in 
only a partial unfreezing of existing methods.
 A similar occurrence took place in the late 1920s and early 
1930s at the company’s electro-technical department where an 
attempt was made to implement the Bedaux system. A docu-
ment dated April 14, 1930, written by the “director/vice-director” 
of elettrotecnico, notes that, “in the electro-technical factory, 
by means of a ‘manufacturing time and analysis office,’ we are 
strongly pursuing the reduction of labor costs using the Bedaux 
method, which we began to adopt experimentally last summer” 
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[AsA fsB 24/26 f.1]. With this development, Ansaldo shows 
itself to have been in the forefront of such developments within 
italy,6 although there is no evidence that the Bedaux system was 
introduced more widely within the company at this time. once 
again, this development seems to have represented a partial 
unfreezing at a local level which failed to generate permanent 
change throughout the organization.
Cost Accounting and Management Control: throughout the 
troubled times from 1918 to the early/mid-1930s, there was one 
notable change to the cost system utilized at Ansaldo. At the be-
ginning of the 20th century, the company operated an historical 
cost system in which the costs of job orders were linked to the fi-
nancial accounting system [see, for example, AsA Ap ssN 33/1]. 
Within the cost system, overheads were allocated to depart-
ments largely on the basis of pre-determined percentages, partly 
reflecting the size of departments as measured by the amount of 
capital invested in them. in 1912 [AsA Ap ssB 963/17], changes 
to the 1904 accounting rules, suggested by ricci, a member of 
Ansaldo’s collegio sindacale,7 included the charging of a part of 
overheads on the basis of direct costs. further moves were made 
in this direction with the issuance of a new set of accounting 
rules in 1921 [AsA fsB 27/2].
 dewerpe [1985] has suggested that budgets were being 
used at Ansaldo by 1914, but he seems to have been referring to 
statements drawn up monthly by each production department 
entitled, “estimates of purchased materials, planned and actual 
expenses and invoices” [AsA Ap ssr 559/1]. the basis on which 
these statements were drawn up is far from clear, but taken to-
gether with the large variances shown when aggregated for all 
departments and the lack of explanation for such variances (see 
table 4) suggests that they did not constitute a serious attempt 
at budgeting. However, other surviving documents, particularly 
the monthly “Preventivi di spesa” (budgeted expenses) for vari-
ous periods up to 1935, do provide comparisons of planned and 
actual expenditure [see, e.g., AsA Ap ssr 558/2]. 
6 Molinari [1999] incorrectly puts the first application of the Bedaux system 
as occurring at Ansaldo in 1940.
7 At that time, the collegio sindacale comprised, with the board and the general 
meeting of the shareholders, one of three main organs within italian companies. 
the collegio sindacale was responsible for ensuring that directors complied with 
legal requirements and that the bookkeeping was correct.
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TABLE 4
Variances between Actual and Planned Expenses, July 1916
planned expenses for all departments l. 9,287,015.50
Actual expenses l. 15,380,131.26
Variance l. 6,093,115.76
source: AsA Ap ssr 559/1. 
 
 limited knowledge of cost systems at other italian compa-
nies during the early decades of the 20th century makes it dif-
ficult to judge whether the one utilized at Ansaldo was advanced 
or not. there were limitations as recognized by pio perrone in 
a letter written to the directors on January 31, 1920: “in our 
company we are really far from knowing exactly the cost of our 
products in all their constituent elements” [AsA Ap ssN 778/5]. 
A major deficiency of the Ansaldo cost system stemmed from 
the manner in which overheads were allocated. the allocation 
method utilized coefficients which failed to reflect the effective 
absorption of overheads [AsA Ap ssN 513], the use of appropri-
ate cost drivers being lacking. furthermore, price setting was 
conducted merely on the basis of adding various percentages to 
direct costs to represent general expenses and “profit,” a system 
which failed to reflect how production levels interfaced with 
costs.
 such concerns were clearly influenced by the perilous 
state of the company’s financial position at the end of World 
War i. thus, in 1919, the perrone brothers established a Gen-
eral inspectorate at Ansaldo in an attempt to increase efficiency. 
Accounting was part of the remit of the administrative arm of 
the inspectorate, while among the duties of the technical arm 
were cost prevention, distribution of work, and the scientific 
organization of production. Although the General inspectorate 
was disbanded in 1921, it did establish a new set of accounting 
rules. these differed from the earlier rules of 1904, modified in 
1912, in an attempt to classify costs using cost drivers linked to 
the volume of productive activity. 
 the specific purpose behind this change was the attempt 
“to know the minimum price at which to accept orders at a 
loss ... when orders are not sufficient to absorb all the produc-
tive capacity” [AsAfsB27/2, March 1921, f.6], a clear recogni-
tion of the importance of direct costs in determining whether 
to produce or not. A second important and novel feature of the 
18
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1921 rules was the classification of costs on three levels [AsA 
fsB27/2, ff. 4-5]:
1. overheads tout court (spese generali)
2. manufacturing costs (spese di lavorazione)
2.1  direct manufacturing costs (spese di lavorazione)
2.2 shop-floor overheads (spese d’officina)
the manufacturing costs were considered to be those costs 
which could be decreased in the case of a reduction of pro-
duction. direct manufacturing costs were those costs specifi-
cally allocated to job orders (generally, labor and raw materials). 
shop-floor overheads, which were considered not to be “directly 
allocable to job orders,” were to “be debited to transitory ac-
counts for statistical purposes, and then allocated to job orders, 
by means of hourly rates, actual or theoretical, or by means of 
other criteria, according to the situation; such criteria being 
established by the technical office, with the agreement of the 
administrative office” [AsAfsB27/2, f.5].8 the second part of the 
1921 rules comprises a list of the “overhead tout court accounts” 
and a list of the shop-floor overhead accounts.
 thus, while the perrones may have acted as a barrier to the 
implementation of certain managerial changes within Ansaldo 
after World War i, in particular the introduction of fordist 
methods, they did oversee the implementation of important 
changes in cost accounting. the increased emphasis on ef-
ficiency enshrined in the new accounting rules was to be a leg-
acy which the perrones were to leave for their successors upon 
which they were able to build. the unfreezing and change intro-
duced by the perrones became re-frozen by successive manage-
ments throughout the 1920s. thus, from 1925, the production 
units were required to send reports to the central management 
on the “fundamental indexes of production and the economic 
trend of the production units.” Basic indicators contained in 
these reports were total cost of manufacturing labor, which 
was considered an index of manufacturing intensity [AsA fsB 
24/52]; job-order portfolio; monthly expenses for personnel and 
auxiliary manpower; the ratios between total general expenses 
and the total labor costs, both direct and auxiliary, considered 
as indicators of the use of productive capacity; profit or loss on 
completed job orders, with an explanation given for each loss; 
8 the ideas underlying these developments clearly stemmed from the work of 
A.H. church. According to fasce [1993], the only translation of his book, Produc-
tion Factors in Cost Accounting and Works Management into italian (as I fattori 
della produzione), was carried out by the General inspectorate of Ansaldo. 
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and the value of cash inflows and outflows.
 cost control in the 1920s therefore seems to have been 
directed towards efficiency, the emphasis oriented towards 
controlling and reducing the cost of direct factors. following 
the experimental adoption of the Bedaux method in 1929, the 
exploitation of productive capacity was analyzed by means of 
a single indirect indicator, i.e., the ratio between the theoretical 
and actual working hours. While there is evidence of the in-
troduction at this time of responsibility accounting, it was of 
an extremely limited kind, effected only at the level of depart-
ments and departmental directors, not within the departments 
themselves. cost determination thus remained centered on the 
productive units with no reference to the analysis of individual 
or group performance, while variance analysis of budgeted 
expenses continued to be carried on in the same way as before 
[e.g., AsA fsB 24/24, AsA fsB 24/17].
ANsAldo: AccouNtiNG ANd MANAGeMeNt 
deVelopMeNts, 1933-1940
Overview: during the 1920s and early 1930s, Ansaldo had suf-
fered from weak market forces, the Wall street crash, the inad-
equacy of its organizational and productive structures, and the 
interference of politicians [rugafiori, 1978]. As a result, in 1933, 
a year in which the company exhibited a major loss of almost 
100 milllion lira after years of negligible profits (see table 3), 
Ansaldo found itself one of the first companies to be taken un-
der the wing of the state’s new industrial holding arm, the iri. 
founded in 1933 by the technocrat Alberto Beneduce, the iri 
took over the industrial securities held by those “mixed banks,” 
such as the Banca commerciale italiana and credito italiano, 
which had fallen into a deep financial crisis [Amatori and Bi-
gatti, 2003, p. 224]. Beneduce designed a structure in which 
firms under state ownership operated in a market environment 
rather than as a nationalized monopoly. initially designed as a 
temporary measure, the iri was declared a permanent institu-
tion in 1937 [ciocca and toniolo, 1994, p. 585]. the iri takeover 
of Ansaldo guaranteed the survival of the firm, which became 
a central plank in the rearmament policy of the fascist govern-
ment. indeed, in 1936, the italian state accounted for 85% of 
Ansaldo’s turnover [rugafiori, 1999, p. 89].
The IRI, Agostino Rocca, and the Implementation of Scientific 
Management: on July 7, 1933, Mario Barenghi, formerly presi-
dent of Ansaldo, became its chief executive officer (ceo) but, in 
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1935, he was replaced by Agostino rocca. With a military and 
engineering background,9 rocca had gained business experi-
ence during the 1920s and early 1930s through his close links 
with Banca commerciale italiana,10 one of the most important 
“mixed banks” of the time. After joining the fascist party in 
1923, rocca became increasingly interested in scientific man-
agement11 and a member of eNios in 1929. He became closely 
associated with the iri upon its formation and was appointed in 
1933 the general manager of dalmine, an iron company where 
he had been employed as an engineer in August 1922. in 1935, 
he became general manager not only of Ansaldo but also of 
siac. from 1938 to 1940, rocca was also general manager of 
finsider, the organization which controlled the iron industry 
holdings of the iri.
 When rocca took over the reins at Ansaldo in 1935, the 
business was in a poor shape. profits were non-existent, the 
plant and machinery were outdated, the organizational struc-
ture was old-fashioned and confused, enterprise was lacking, 
and the implementation of modern managerial techniques had 
long been delayed. there was little coordination between the 
various parts of the business. production remained artisan-
based with the engineer as the “shop-floor hero,” solving day-
to-day problems as they arose. in order to effect the changes 
in organizational structure and culture which he saw as nec-
essary, rocca had to remove as many of the existing barriers 
to such change as possible while simultaneously enhancing 
9 rocca attended a military high school and the reale Accademia di tori-
no. After serving as an officer in the italian Army from May 1915 to december 
1919, he graduated from the politecnico di Milano, as an electrical/industrial 
engineer in May 1921.
10 links with Banca commerciale italiana began in 1921 when rocca 
married Maria Queirazza, daughter of one of the bank’s managers. in 1926, 
Giuseppe toeplitz, general manager of the Banca commerciale, appointed 
rocca as administrative inspector of many important italian companies, such 
as Mira lanza, a factory producing detergents, where he supposedly imple-
mented a cost accounting system based on those used in the u.s. [rugafiori, 
1999, p. 81]. details of this system are unfortunately unknown. in 1929, rocca 
became an employee of the technical-industrial office of the Banca commer-
ciale where he worked as an inspector and/or consultant for the companies 
controlled by the bank. from 1930, he participated in sofinid, an operation es-
tablished by the Banca commerciale in that year to oversee the bank’s portfo-
lio of industrial companies, which included important concerns such as terni, 
sip, and italgas. sofinid attempted to sell off parts of the portfolio to other 
investors [rugafiori, 1984].
11 in the early 1920s, rocca undertook various journeys throughout eu-
rope and the u.s. during which he learned about scientific management.
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the forces driving change. thus, in an attempt to apply mana-
gerial ideas and concepts with which he was familiar, rocca 
introduced managers from other firms, firing many foremen 
he identified as a barrier to the implementation of new ideas. 
Nevertheless, despite the support of these new managers and 
Ansaldo’s position of power within a stable governance system 
(iri as the sole shareholder and fascism firmly established), 
rocca faced stiff resistance to the implementation of new ideas 
at all levels within the company.
 following an in-depth analysis of the business, rocca 
embarked on a program of restructuring and rationalization 
focused around a functionally based organizational structure 
in an attempt to generate major efficiency gains at the factories 
[AsA f.sB 3/7c]. one of the first developments and one which 
was to play an important role in these early changes was the 
 creation in August 1935 of the Organizzazione nuovi impianti, 
the central office for the organization of new plants (oNi). un-
der enrico Vandone, one of the most active members of eNios 
who had been brought by rocca from fiat, oNi was charged 
with establishing a new organizational structure. in particular, 
oNi promoted studies and elaborated programs incorporating 
taylorist methods. While these helped to improve efficiency, they 
also served to increase the bureaucratic structure of the compa-
ny’s organization and its information needs [AsA f.sB 25/48]. 
furthermore, Vandone’s methods did not meet with universal 
approval as they were considered too complex and bureaucratic. 
opposition from managers hostile to the application of scientific 
management principles first forced him to be moved from the 
oNi to the position of director of the mechanical department 
and ultimately in 1940 to be fired for excessive authoritarianism 
[Molinari, 1999].
 it was under the auspices of oNi that the first systematic 
attempt was made to introduce piecework systems throughout 
Ansaldo. thus, a document dated october 15, 1937 notes a con-
tinuing concern within Ansaldo over the organization of labor 
on the shop-floor, together with resistance to new systems from 
within the ranks of management [AsA fsB 24/46]. in it, sarli 
[AsA fsB 24/46], the director of the elettrotecnico department, 
refers to “systems of technical-bureaucratic elaboration and the 
preparation of manufactures”: 
these systems are constituted by a complex of specific 
‘modules’ – whose conformation (which should be as 
appropriate as possible) has a very big influence on the 
validity of the systems – and related compilation rules. 
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these systems are something which cannot be – and 
which have never been – created suddenly by someone 
but which have to be the result of an evolution coming 
from the experience of a specific department over the 
years. … substituting, within a specific department, a 
new system to the one currently in use is like trying to 
substitute, within a population, the existing language 
with a new, rationally created one… it has to be noted 
that the nature of production (in particular mass- and 
non-mass production) has a great influence on the 
nature of the system. … We classify: systeM A, the 
system which was in use in these departments until 18 
months ago; systeM B, the system introduced by oNi 
18 months ago and gradually applied; systeM c, the 
system we wish to propose as definitive.
sarli was highly critical of system B, noting that under it, the 
technical staff, despite an increase in number from 35 to 57, 
had been unable to perform the functions that it had carried out 
18 months before with fewer personnel. this, together with the 
increased difficulty in organizing production programs, led sarli 
to advocate a move to the new arrangement, system c.12
 in 1939, rocca decided to move from a centralized, func-
tional structure for the company to a divisional organization 
with each manufacturing department controlling its own mar-
keting, production, and capital budgeting. planning, however, 
remained a centralized function with managerial control par-
tially implemented through target setting, budgeted expenses, 
and the allocation of investment funds, although we have found 
no evidence of the use of roi at Ansaldo at this time. the new 
organizational structure was set out in rocca’s circolAre 
A.d. N. 66 [AsA fsB 3/7], dated January 5, 1940, and the ac-
companying organizational chart [AsA fsB 3/7c]. At the top of 
the managerial hierarchy was to be a general director; a direc-
tors’ committee comprising the ceo (rocca), the general direc-
tor, and all departmental directors; and a departmental commit-
tee, comprising the general director and the managers of each 
department. the management of the departments was under the 
charge of the directors, while central management was in charge 
of inspection, administration, and other staffing functions, such 
as the building and plant repair section, the operations manage-
ment section, the commercial section, the administrative sec-
tion, the personnel section, and the general secretary’s office.
12 unfortunately, precise details of the various systems are not provided.
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The Development of Management Accounting during the Rocca 
Period: Although an engineer, rocca had a clear understanding 
of both financial and management accounting, which he had 
developed abroad [rugafiori, 1984; lussana, 1996]. When ap-
pointed general manager, he made a first attempt at implement-
ing scientific management techniques across the business and 
instituted a responsibility accounting system [AsA d. sB 3/7 
c]. initially, while the business was organized on a functional 
basis, direct (productive) and indirect (non-productive and aux-
iliary) cost centers were created. cost accounting was conducted 
within each production unit by a separate coi (cost accounting) 
office responsible for recording materials, purchase and sales 
invoices, and cost accounting. the various coi offices were co-
ordinated by the Direzione servizi amministrativi (management 
administration service). 
 during the late 1930s and early 1940s, rocca established 
many accounting and costing norms which not only in-
fluenced the method adopted but reflected changes in the 
managerial structure of the business. on the more technical 
accounting side, Norm 62000 of January 16, 1936, for example, 
stated that the closing cost balances were to be debited only 
with direct costs (material, direct labor, and expenses). All other 
cost elements were to be considered indirect and part of general 
expenses which, for each department, were to be allocated on 
the basis of direct labor, the percentage being calculated for 
each department using established rules. only auxiliary services 
(e.g., power, water, steam, transportation, etc.) were to be allo-
cated on the basis of consumption, actual or theoretical [Aval-
lone, 2002]. Norm 000631, dated october 11, 1938, classified 
direct labor as the cost for the laborers who manufactured the 
product, while auxiliary labor comprised the cost for services, 
such as repairing, building equipment, plant transforma-
tion, etc. together, direct and auxiliary labor were considered 
productive labor, while unproductive labor, such as cleaning, 
foremen, machine preparers, etc., was not directly related to 
production. Norm 640000 of July 3, 1936, meanwhile, dem-
onstrates the links between cost and financial accounting at 
Ansaldo. inventories were determined in the same way by the 
coi for all productive units and credited to account coi/10 
(inventory) and debited to coi/30 (direct job order expenses).
 under rocca’s various norms, responsibility for the plan-
ning, production scheduling, and overhead cost control was 
divided between headquarters staff and the various coi. An 
internal audit office was established in July 1937. industrial 
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accounting remained within the productive units. Norm 63003 
of october 1939 defined the basic duties of each coi office 
as the bookkeeping for and the control of (1) the movement 
of material, (2) direct costs, (3) labor cost, (4) overheads for 
every cost pool, (5) product cost, and (6) monthly data for 
financial accounting purposes. each coi was also required 
to provide the general and departmental management with 
reports through which they could control activities. such 
reports covered the expenses of individual departments, of-
fices, and services, and the cost of each product. further, they 
should offer judgments regarding actual and estimated figures. 
under circolAre A.d. N. 66 [AsA fsB 3/7], dated January 
5, 1940, industrial accounting remained the responsibility of 
departments subject to checking, audit, and approval by the 
company’s central management. 
suMMAry ANd coNclusioN
 conditions within most italian firms during the 1920s 
were not especially conducive to the implementation of scien-
tific management. despite the formation of eNios in 1926, 
many elements of taylorism were either anathema to italian 
industrialists or impossible to implement in italian firms due 
to political and socio-cultural factors which influenced the 
customs and traditions that pervaded italian industry. Not the 
least of these was the rise of fascism immediately after a long 
period of social hardship, class struggles, and strong reaction by 
entrepreneurs to the problems resulting from the labor troubles 
of the “red  biennium.” Another contributing factor was the 
lack of managerialism in italian businesses, partly reflecting a 
high concentration of family ownership. the lack of a strong, 
dynamic engineering profession or an entrepreneurial culture, 
as well as heavy reliance on the state by firms, meant that scien-
tific management innovations lacked the fertile soil within italy 
in which to establish themselves between the wars. Neverthe-
less, companies such as fiat, Magneti Marelli, cantiere Navale 
triestino, officine Meccaniche di Novara, olivetti, Manifatture 
cotoniere Meridionali, Manifattura pellami e calzature, peru-
gina, and cirio did begin to adopt some scientific management 
practices in the 1920s and early 1930s [Volpato, 1978, pp. 192-
193]. our case study firm, Ansaldo, a leading player in the iron 
and steel, engineering, and shipbuilding sectors in italy in the 
early decades of the 20th century, also shows evidence of piece-
meal experimentation with scientific management before 1930, 
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antecedent to embracing it more whole-heartedly in the second 
half of the 1930s. 
 events such as the implementation of taylorite techniques 
at the cogne iron mines about 1927 and the Bedaux system at 
the electro-technical factory in 1929/1930, however, represented 
simply local management initiatives that did not spread more 
widely. Widespread adoption of scientific management only oc-
curred when an individual in a key management position, rocca 
as chief executive, was convinced of the potential benefits. even 
so, the changes introduced by rocca represented the implemen-
tation of a narrow version of scientific management, focusing 
on the rationalization of production techniques and procedures. 
in this, however, Ansaldo was little different from many compa-
nies throughout the world in both europe and America [Hoxie, 
1920], which often selected only those parts of taylorism which 
they thought useful while rejecting or pushing aside other, less 
palatable, more contentious, or potentially more disruptive as-
pects [see, smith and Boyns, 2005 on Britain]. 
 to be successful in this narrow implementation, how-
ever, rocca had to address the problem of significant barriers to 
change enshrined with the existing organizational structure of 
the company and the incumbent management culture. deliber-
ate steps were taken to reduce the barriers to change (e.g., exist-
ing foremen), while simultaneously enhancing the driving forces 
for change (e.g., bringing in outside managers well-versed in the 
ideas of scientific management). despite this, the process was by 
no means a smooth one. Vandone, for example, was brought in 
as an important driver of change, but his methods on occasion 
served only to reinforce resistance, resulting in his removal from 
the center of events and eventual dismissal from the company 
altogether. Nevertheless, the organization which spearheaded 
the implementation of the new methods and which he had 
helped establish, the oNi, continued to be an important driving 
force even after his removal.
 While aspects of scientific management were gradually ad-
opted at Ansaldo throughout the interwar period, there is also 
evidence of changes in cost accounting identified in two periods 
– 1919-1922 and post-1935. in the first, a key role was played 
by the owners of the business, the perrone brothers. Although 
the perrones acted as a barrier to the introduction of fordist 
methods at Ansaldo immediately after World War i, despite 
their knowledge of and interest in scientific management, they 
did represent a positive force in respect to cost accounting de-
velopments. the company’s worsening financial plight in 1919 
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fueled a growing concern with efficiency, leading the perrones 
to establish the General inspectorate which introduced new 
costing rules in 1921 that focused on direct costs. Although the 
perrones lost control of the company in 1922, the changes they 
set in motion proved beneficial to the firm’s management dur-
ing the 1920s. in the post-perrone era, successive managements 
utilized costs for purposes of managerial control, contrary to the 
view of Benjamin Barabato et al. [1996] who have expressed the 
view that the lack of competition and closeness of many large 
businesses to the state militated against the use of costs for pur-
poses of managerial control and efficiency in italy between the 
wars. 
 the second significant episode of change in cost account-
ing, including the adoption of elements of responsibility ac-
counting, coincided with the more widespread development of 
scientific management following the appointment of rocca as 
chief executive. the clear link between these two developments 
from 1935 onwards supports the idea put forward by Boyns 
and edwards [1997] that changes in cost/management account-
ing often occur as part of a symbiotic process of change within 
organizational structures and management systems rather than 
as part of a causal mechanism, as suggested by chandler [1977, 
1990] and Johnson and Kaplan [1987]. perhaps it was the failure 
to implement scientific management in its widest sense which 
explains the lack of development of the chandlerian M-form 
structure and the failure to adopt accounting techniques associ-
ated therewith, especially budgeting and standard costing. But, 
once again, in this respect during the interwar period, Ansaldo 
was no different from companies such as the sperry corpora-
tion in the u.s. [fleischman and Marquette, 2003], thyssens in 
Germany [fear, 2005], renault and Berliet in france [Moutet, 
1992; Zimnovitch, 1997; Berland, 1999], or many firms in the 
British chemical and iron and steel industries [edwards et al., 
2002; Boyns et al., 2004]. 
 if Ansaldo was not different from many other companies 
across the industrialized world, what lessons can we learn from 
it in relation to the issue of identifying the key factors which 
influence change in organizational structures and cost/man-
agement accounting? According to lewin’s theory, change can 
only occur when the forces promoting change outweigh those 
resisting it. this study has found that the balance of forces for 
and against change can ebb and flow over time, and that it is 
not necessarily the case that all changes will become permanent 
or widespread throughout an organization. While both internal 
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and external factors have been found significant in influencing 
change, the Ansaldo case emphasizes the importance of key 
individuals in effecting permanent change, especially in the area 
of cost accounting, therefore supporting the work of Granlund 
[2001]. from the perspective of Busco et al. [2007], the perrones 
played an important role during the 1919-1921 period, while 
rocca represented the key agency through which management 
accounting change was effected in the late 1930s. Both the per-
rones and rocca, however, carried out this role within a broader 
context, comprising a combination of institutional pressures, 
reflecting the socio-political and economic influences of the 
time. this study suggests that while accounting historians need 
to understand the contextualizing forces surrounding change, it 
might be more useful to focus more closely on the role of indi-
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